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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 960405-CA
Priority No. 2

NORMAN ANDREW HAGA,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment
of conviction entered May 20, 1996.

This Court has jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1996)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (9) (a) (Supp. 1996)
Rule 4 04, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
The text of the above statutes, rules and constitutional
provisions is contained in Addendum A.

ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Issue I:

Did the prosecutor commit reversible misconduct

when he made unsupported claims that Appellant's key alibi
witness had received stolen property from Appellant, using the
witness's prior conviction of Theft by Receiving as character
evidence to support the claim?
Standard of Review:

This Court will reverse a jury

verdict on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct if the defendant
demonstrates that
[t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call
to the attention of the jury a matter it would
not be justified in considering in determining
its verdict and, if so, under the circumstances
of the particular case, whether the error is
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there
would have been a more favorable result.
[citations omitted].
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Preservation:

This issue is preserved at R. 608, 609,

610.
Issue II:

Did the prosecutor commit reversible

misconduct when he implied that because Appellant's alibi
witnesses had not come forward to law enforcement prior to the
time required by statute, their testimony was not credible?
Standard of Review:
Preservation:

See Issue I.

This issue is preserved at R. 448, 606-

607.
Issue III:

Did defense counsel render ineffective

assistance of counsel for failing to object when the prosecutor
2

argued that the victim had a bad "feeling" about Appellant
because he sensed that Appellant had criminal inclinations?
Standard of Review:

In order to establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his
lawyer's performance was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) "there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different" had counsel not performed deficiently.

State v.

Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996).
Issue IV:

Did defense counsel render ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to object to the prosecutor's
expression of his personal opinion of the weight of the photo
spread identification evidence?
Standard of Review:
Issue V:

See Issue III.

Did the trial court have statutory authority to

order restitution to the victim's insurance company?
Standard of Review:

The question of whether a sentence

has been imposed illegally is a question of law reviewed without
deference to the trial court.

Rule 22(2), Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995).
Preservation of Issue:

An illegal sentence can be

challenged for the first time on appeal.

Brooks, 908 P.2d at

860.
Issue VI:

Did defense counsel render ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to seek a remedy to the State's
failure to comply with the rules of discovery?
3

Standard of Review:

See Issue III.

Issue VII: Did defense counsel render ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and present
evidence that prior to trial, the State had sent the only
eyewitness to the crime a photograph of Appellant?
Standard of Review:

See Issue III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On November 21, 1994, Appellant was found guilty by a
jury of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1994), and Burglary, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1994), the Honorable
James S. Sawaya presiding.

Appellant was not sentenced until

May 20, 1996, and Judgment was entered on that date.

R. 191-92.

On June 12, 1996, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 12, 1994, Dee Leasing, a wholesale computer
store located at 177 West 2100 South, was burglarized.

R. 528.

On this date at approximately 9:30 a.m., Richard Engh ("Engh")
delivered a van to Dee Leasing.
front door was open.

R. 321, 329.

There was no one inside the business.

door looked like it had been forced.
dead.

Engh noticed the

Engh notified the police.

or any suspicious vehicles.

The

R. 325. The telephone was

R. 326. He did not see anyone

R. 329.

Detective Dustin Hansen ("Hansen") with the South Salt
4

Lake Police Department responded to Engh's call.

R. 330-31.

The

front door to Dee Leasing was open and the lock was lying on the
floor.

R. 332.

Several doors had been pried open.

R. 333.

The building appeared to have been entered through the east door
which had been pried open.

R. 335.

Upon discovering that the

telephone was dead, Hansen climbed onto the roof to inspect the
lines.

R. 336-37.

Dee Leasing is surrounded by a high fence.

The secretary had unlocked the gate after the crime.

R. 341.

Hansen climbed a metal tire rack next to the east fence of the
building onto the roof of an adjacent building, and climbed down
from that roof onto the roof of Dee Leasing.

R. 337-38.

The

lines had been cut close to the road, at the top of the roof.
R. 338, 340.
Larry Olson ("Olson"), owner of the On & Off Roadhouse
located next door to Dee Leasing, told Hansen that at
approximately 9:20 that morning, he saw somebody loading boxes
out of Dee Leasing into a white pickup.

He described a white

male, 36 to 38 years old, bald, with light brown hair, five-six
to five-eight, about 150 pounds with a thin build.

R. 342-43.

Olson told Hansen the truck was an old Chevy, with blue, orange
and black lettering on the side.

Olson told Hansen that he could

not read the lettering clearly, but it had something to do with
insulation.

R. 343.

Olson told him it could have been a

Commercial Insulation truck.

R. 351-52.

Hansen testified that

there is a business called Commercial Insulators located about a
mile and a half from Dee Leasing that uses vehicles matching that
5

description.

R. 344.

of Dee Leasing.

Hansen also found human feces on the floor

R. 345.

Fingerprints were taken from the scene

and turned over to the State Crime Lab.

R. 346.

Tracy Tingey ("Tingey"), a detective with the South Salt
Lake City Police Department, showed Olson a photo spread
containing a photo of Appellant.
identified Appellant.

R. 441, 445-46.

R. 446-47.

Olson

Olson told Tingey during his

initial interview that he had seen an individual loading boxes
into the back of a pickup truck the morning of the burglary.
R. 447.

Tingey testified that the letter opener and screwdriver

used in the burglary were tested for fingerprints.
There were no fingerprints on the screwdriver.

R. 451.

The fingerprints

on the letter opener did not match Appellant's fingerprints.
R. 452.
Olson testified that on the morning of the burglary at
approximately 9:00 a.m., he saw an early model Chevy pickup truck
parked in front of Dee Leasing.

R. 462, 465-66.

standing toward the back of the pickup truck.

He saw someone

As he walked

around the front of the truck, he noticed a logo on the side of
the truck that said "Custom Installations."

R. 466.

Thinking

that the owner of Dee Leasing was having something installed,
Olson did not notify the police.

R. 466-67, 472, 483.

Olson did

try to take down the license number of the truck, but the front
plate was missing.

R. 467.

Olson described the individual he

saw as a smaller male with a receding hair line.

R. 469.

Olson

testified that the man just stood there, not doing anything.
6

R. 470.

Olson made eye contact with the man, went back into his

store for about five minutes, and then came back outside.
R. 470-71.

The truck was still there, but Olson could not

remember if the man was still there.

R. 471.

Olson testified

that he did not see the man loading any items of merchandise into
the truck.

R. 4 71.

The prosecutor asked Olson if he remembered

telling Officer Tingey that he had seen the man loading boxes
into the truck.

R.

seeing any boxes.

474.

Olson stated he could not remember

R. 474.

Officer Tingey, "a long time later," showed Olson a photo
spread.

R. 474-76.

had seen.

R.

Olson identified Appellant as the person he

. Next to the photograph of Appellant, Olson

wrote, "This is the person loading P.U. at Dee Leasing."

R. 476.

Despite seeing this notation, Olson could not remember seeing the
man loading anything onto the truck.
was admitted into evidence.

R.

R. 477.

506.

The photo spread

Olson identified Appellant

as the person he saw by the truck on the morning of the burglary.
R. 478.

Olson also testified that often pallets were left on the

west side of his business adjacent to Dee Leasing.

R. 481-82.

Olson first testified that could not say how long he
observed the man near the truck as he pulled into his business.
R. 4 91.
minutes.

He then stated he saw the man for at least one to two
R. 491-92.

Olson testified at the preliminary hearing

that he observed the man for less than a minute.

R. 4 91-93.

Olson was unsure whether he could still see the man near the
truck after he had parked his car.
7

R. 491.

Olson admitted that at the preliminary hearing, he
testified that he was not sure if he saw the man put any boxes
into the truck.

R. 4 94.

Olson was not able to describe the

clothing style or color of the man he saw.

R. 498-99.

On May 10, 1994, Clayton Dumas ("Dumas") with the West
Valley Police Department saw a truck he believed matched the
description of the truck Olson saw at Dee Leasing the morning of
the burglary.

R. 522-23.

The truck belonged to Appellant, had

broken down and was being repaired by him.

R. 524.

Appellant's

truck was an older white Chevy, with red/orange lettering on a
blue triangle that said "Intermountain Installers."

See State's

Exhibit 10-S.
Donald Kaufer ("Kaufer"), the owner of Dee Leasing,
testified that on March 12, 1994 at about 10:00 a.m., he received
a call from Engh that his business was wide open and had been
ransacked.

R. 527, 531.

Kaufer discovered that the side door

had been opened with a pry bar, and the alarm disarmed.
33.
334.

The dead bolt on the front door had been removed.

R. 532R. 533-

A letter opener or screwdriver had been used to pry open

the cash drawer.

R. 534.

Kaufer testified that there was a

pallet by the fence that could have been used as a ladder to
scale the fence enclosing the business.

R. 535.

Kaufer

testified that approximately $14,251.07 in computer parts and
equipment were missing.

R. 545.

Detective Hansen told Kaufer

that he believed whoever burglarized the business had been there
before, and gave him Olson's description.
8

R. 554-55.

Kaufer

told Hansen that the description matched Appellant.

R. 555.

Kaufer indicated that Appellant was a prior customer who he had
hired once to repair a computer part.

R. 547. They had no

disagreements in connection with the repair work.

R. 550.

Richard Perry ("Perry") testified for Appellant.

R. 595.

Perry testified that Appellant was at his place of business,
A & P Tire and Oil, 6217 West 4100 South, from 9:00 a.m. to
9:00 p.m. on March 12, 1994. R. 596-97.

Perry testified that

Appellant was never gone for more than 15 minutes during the day.
R. 597. Perry stated that Appellant was limping that day from an
injury to his foot.

R. 598. Perry admitted that in 1986, he had

a prior felony conviction for theft by receiving and attempted
homicide.

R. 604.

Steven Lynn Earl ("Earl"), an employee at A & P Tire,
testified that Appellant was at A & P Tire all day on March 12,
1994 working on a computer keyboard.
that Appellant was dragging his foot.

R. 616. He, too, noticed
R. 616. Ruth Haga

("Mrs. Haga"), Appellant's wife, testified that Appellant had a
swollen foot and was unable to even walk up and down the stairs
at his home.

R.

624-25.

On March 11, 1994, she had taken

Appellant to the hospital to have his foot treated.

R. 632.

Dr. Brian Turner testified that he had treated Appellant
on March 11, 1994 for foot pain.

He observed Appellant limping,

and noted that his foot was swollen and the joint below the big
toe inflamed.

R. 637-38.

Dr. Turner gave Appellant an injection

in his foot for pain and to decrease the swelling.
9

R. 643.

Dr. Turner testified that based on his observations, Appellant
would have had difficulty engaging in any kind of physical
activity.

R. 639.

Dr. Turner did, however, admit on cross-

examination that it would not have been impossible for Appellant
to climb a ladder if he had really wanted to do so.

R. 647.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prosecutor committed numerous acts of reversible
misconduct.

The prosecutor, during cross-examination of

Appellant's key alibi witness, made unsupported inferences that
the witness had purchased stolen property from Appellant.

He

then argued at closing without any factual support in the record
that the witness dealt in stolen property, and therefore should
not be believed.

The prosecutor then used the witness's prior

conviction eight years ago for Theft by Receiving as character
evidence to support his argument.

This line of questioning and

argument violated the longstanding rule that the prosecutor
cannot imply the existence of a prejudicial fact unless he has
some proof of its truth.

Likewise, the prosecutor is not

permitted to use a prior conviction as evidence of a witness's
bad character.
The prosecutor also unfairly undermined Appellant's alibi
defense by implying that because the witnesses had not come
forward to law enforcement prior to the statutory period, the
alibi was fabricated.

This inference improperly encouraged the

jury to speculate that there was something suspicious about the
10

timing of the notice of alibi when, in fact, the defense had
complied with the law.
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to object to other acts of prosecutorial
misconduct.

Counsel failed to object when the prosecutor

elicited testimony from the victim that when he first met
Appellant, he had an "uncomfortable feeling" about him.

The

prosecutor then invited the jury to rely on the victim's
"feeling" as proof of Appellant's guilt, implying that he had
somehow sensed that Appellant was a bad person from the beginning
and had been right.

Defense counsel also failed to object when

the prosecutor commented on the weight of the photo spread
identification evidence and referred to Appellant's defense as a
"ploy" meant to embarrass and harass the victim.
Defense counsel also rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to seek a remedy when the State failed to
comply with the rules of discovery by providing counsel with
invoices and receipts documenting the existence of the claimed
stolen property.

Lastly, counsel failed to investigate and

present evidence that the eyewitness to the crime had been given
a photograph of Appellant after the photo spread identification,
but prior to the preliminary hearing and trial.
The trial court was without statutory authority to impose
restitution to the victim's insurance company for losses it
covered pursuant to the policy.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(9) (a)

(Supp. 1996) defines a victim as the person against whom the
11

crime has been directly committed.

In this case, the direct

victim of the crime was Dee Leasing.

The insurance company is

not a victim and is therefore not entitled to restitution.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
MISCONDUCT.
Prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal occurs where
(1) "the [prosecutor's] remarks 'called to the jurors' attention
matters which they would not be justified in considering in
reaching a verdict" and (2) such remarks were harmful.

State v.

Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) (quotations omitted); see also
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 485-6 (Utah 1984).

A. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY MAKING
PREJUDICIAL, UNSUPPORTED INFERENCES DURING CROSSEXAMINATION OF APPELLANT'S ALIBI WITNESS AND
USING HIS PRIOR CONVICTION AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM.
Generally, it is error for the prosecutor to ask a
defense witness a question that "implies the existence of a
prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can prove the existence
of the fact.

Otherwise, the only limit on such a line of

questioning would be the prosecutor's imagination."

Emmett, 839

P.2d at 786-87; State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

In Palmer, the prosecutor, during cross-examination of

the defendant in a child sex case, implied that the defendant had
told the child's stepfather he had inappropriate feelings towards
12

the victim.

860 P.2d at 342.

Because the prosecutor never put

on any evidence to support the allegation, the court concluded
that the prosecutor committed misconduct.

.Id. at 342-43.

The

court found the prosecutor's misconduct so "egregious" that it
reviewed the issue despite the fact that no objection had been
made at trial.

Id. at 343.

See also Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786-87

(prosecutor's unsupported question to defendant if he had
rehearsed his testimony with his attorney error).
In this case, during cross-examination of Appellant's key
alibi witness, Perry, the prosecutor implied without any
supporting evidence that Perry had purchased stolen computer
parts from Appellant.
Prosecutor: The computer that you actually got,
where did you get the computer?
Witness:
Paul.

I got it from a man by the name of

Prosecutor:
Witness:

Adams

Prosecutor:
computers?
Witness:
R. 607-08.

Do you know his last name?

He is in the business of selling

No.

At this point, defense counsel objected to the

inference that Perry's computer equipment was stolen.

R. 608.

The court allowed the prosecutor to continue the line of
questioning.
Prosecutor:
Mr. Haga?
Witness:

Did you purchase the program from

No.
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Prosecutor: What software was Mr. Haga using to
program your computer?
Witness:
R.

608.

Just some computer disks like DOS.

Defense counsel then objected to relevancy of the

questions.

In response, the prosecutor admitted that he was

trying to infer that Appellant was selling stolen computer parts
and software to his friends, including Perry.
Prosecutor: Let me explain. It goes to motive.
If this person is stealing computer components
and software and then turning around and
retailing them or wholesaling them or backdooring
them to friends or associates or other people,
that is a motive for theft. I'm trying to
explore that with this individual.
R. 609.

Over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor again

implied that Perry had purchased stolen computer parts from
Appellant.
Prosecutor: Did you buy any computer equipment
from Mr. Haga?
Witness:

No.

Prosecutor: Did you at any time buy any computer
equipment from Mr. Haga?
Witness:

No.

Prosecutor:
Witness:

Any disks?

No.

Prosecutor: Any other components that would be
associated with a computer?
Witness: I have a keyboard that belongs to
Norman, and he has my other one that he is
supposed to be repairing it.
Prosecutor:
Mr. Haga?
Witness:

When did you get a keyboard from

Two months ago.
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Prosecutor: Did you ever check to see if it had
a serial number?
Witness:

Yes, it does.

Prosecutor: Did you attempt to ascertain whether
or not it had been stolen?
Witness:
R. 609-610.

I didn't ask him that, no.

Again defense counsel objected and challenged the

prosecutor to produce evidence to support his line of
questioning.

R. 610.

The prosecutor was allowed to continue.

Prosecutor: Did you get any kind of an invoice
or bill or anything to suggest that Mr. Haga had
procured it through a retailer or wholesaler
prior to him giving it to you?
Witness: No. He let me borrow it.
give it to me or sell it to me.
Prosecutor:
Witness:

R. 610-11.

Are you still using it?

Yes, I am.

Prosecutor:
Witness:

He did not

Is that at your place of business?

Yes, it is.

The prosecutor never produced a shred of evidence to

support the implied allegation that Perry had purchased stolen
computer equipment from Appellant.

Though the prosecutor told

the trial court his questions were intended to explore
Appellant's motive, it is clear from his statements in closing
argument that he was trying to impeach the credibility of
Appellant's main alibi witness.1

x

.
The prosecutor's claimed justification for engaging in
this line of questioning is suspect for the simple reason that
motive in a theft case is seldom a mystery.
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[Defense Counsel] wants you to be cynical about
Mr. Kaufer who is not a convicted felon, and yet
he wants you to have all the trust for him, with
Mr. Perry who is. That's ludicrous. And, yes, a
felony conviction, particularly when it's Theft
by Receiving, is something you can consider on an
alibi witness. And it's the same Rick Perry
alibi, convicted felon witness who apparently
isn't too careful that's he's buying computer
components from people who aren't even in the
business of selling, a friend. I asked whether
Paul, whoever it was, I asked is Paul in the
wholesale/retail business? No, he's somebody who
came in the store and I bought it. Well, are his
parts hot, too? And that takes place, ladies and
gentlemen. There's a whole black market
situation going on. If you read the paper this
weekend the Soviet Union, Russian General selling
black market parts. It's a whole enterprise that
goes on. That's why people steal and fence
stolen property, to make money in their business,
whatever.
R. 424-25.2
This is precisely the type of conduct forbidden in
Emmett and Palmer.

The prosecutor was allowed to run rampant and

engage in a line of questioning that was highly prejudicial, but
was never supported by the evidence.

The prosecutor's misconduct

during cross-examination was exacerbated by his remarks in
closing argument where he argued, based on unsupported innuendo

2

. Defense counsel did not object to this argument. However,
in Palmer, the court held that the prosecutor's use of unsupported
innuendo was plain error, even if not readily apparent to the trial
court. 860 P.2d at 343-44. The prosecutor's use of unsupported
innuendo in this case was far more extensive than in Palmer. Also,
by closing arguments, the State had presented all its evidence. By
then, it should have been apparent to the court that the State had
presented no evidence to support its cross-examination and closing
argument. Lastly, though counsel had objected repeatedly and been
overruled on this issue, after all the evidence was submitted,
counsel should have renewed the objection.
Though counsel's
performance in this respect was deficient, the clearer grounds for
reversal lies in Palmer and the conclusion that it was plain error.
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on cross-examination, that the jury should discredit Perry's
testimony because he likely profited from Appellant's crime by
purchasing stolen computer equipment from him.
The prosecutor committed further misconduct by arguing
Perry's felony conviction substantively in closing.

Perry had

admitted that approximately eight years ago, he had been
convicted of Theft by Receiving.

R. 604.

It is well established

that under Utah Rules of Evidence 4 04 and 609, past criminal
convictions are only admissible for the limited purpose of
attacking credibility.

Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785.

In Emmett, the

prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued that because the
defendant's prior forgery conviction involved a family member, he
was the type of person who committed crimes against his family.
Id. at 785-86.3
In this case, the prosecutor also argued Perry's prior
conviction for Theft by Receiving substantively by using the
nature of the conviction as character evidence to support his
allegation that Perry had received stolen property from
Appellant, and was for that reason an untrustworthy alibi
witness.

In conjunction with the fact that this allegation was

totally unsupported by the record, the prosecutor's conduct is
3

. As indicated previously, counsel did not object to the
prosecutor's comments in closing on the grounds that he was using
Perry's conviction as character evidence. However, pursuant to
Emmett, the prosecutor's conduct is plain error. 839 P.2d at 786
(holding that prosecutor's use of defendant's prior conviction as
character evidence in closing argument was plain error). Likewise,
though clearly plain error pursuant to Emmett, counsel was also
ineffective for failing to object to such an obvious misuse of
Perry's prior conviction.
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particularly outrageous.
The prosecutor's misconduct constituted reversible error.
His unfair and unsupported line of attack went to the heart of
Appellant's alibi defense.

In a case where the evidence is weak

or conflicting, misconduct of this nature is far more likely to
improperly influence the jury.

Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786.

In this

case, the evidence against Appellant was limited solely to one
questionable eyewitness identification.

Also, the jury was

presented with a compelling alibi defense and evidence that
Appellant was not physically able to commit the crime.

See

Section III of this Brief for a complete recitation of the facts.
For this reason, this case is similar to Emmett and Palmer and
reversal is required.

B. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
INFERRING THAT APPELLANT'S ALIBI WAS FABRICATED
BECAUSE HIS WITNESSES DID NOT APPROACH THE POLICE
PRIOR TO THE DEFENSE GIVING STATUTORY NOTICE OF
ALIBI.
The prosecutor on several occasions asked witnesses
whether Appellant's alibi witnesses had come forward prior to
receiving statutory notice of his alibi.

The prosecutor asked

Officer Tingey if anyone had come forward and indicated that
Appellant had an alibi.

R. 448.

The prosecutor also cross-

examined Appellant's key alibi witness, Perry, as to whether he
had contacted the police.

R. 606.

Though the trial court had

earlier sustained defense counsel's objection to this line of
questioning, he allowed the prosecutor to continue.
18

R. 606.

Prosecutor: Did you at any time attempt to go to
the police or advise the police of what was asked
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, we have already
discussed this. He doesn't have a duty to go the
police.
Prosecutor:
does.
The Court:

I agree.

I'm not alleging that he

You may answer.

The Witness:

What?

Prosecutor: Did you ever advise any police
agency, once you knew Mr. Haga had been arrested
that in fact he might have an alibi?
The Witness:

No.

R. 606-07.
This line of questioning was misleading and improperly
invited the jury to speculate that the witnesses did not come
forward because the alibi was fabricated.

This type of

insinuation is improper because alibi witnesses have no duty to
come forward to the police.

Indeed, defense counsel would likely

advise the witnesses to wait until after notice of alibi has been
sent to talk with law enforcement, as it was in this case.
People v. Kraai, 285 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
("Discrediting an alibi witness by insinuating her failure to act
as a good citizen is not permissible."); People v. Costales, 87
A.D.2d 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (It is improper for a prosecutor
to attack the credibility of an alibi witness for failing to come
forward when the witness has no civic duty to do so.)
In People v. Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d 631, 680-81 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977), the court reversed the defendant's conviction because
19

the prosecutor repeatedly argued that his alibi was fabricated
because the witnesses had not come forward to the state prior to
trial.

The court noted:
[N]o stigma should be attached to the testimony
of a witness on a crucial issue solely because it
is rendered for one side rather than the other.
Cross-examination and summation may not be based
upon fictitious assumptions which only confuse
the fact-finders and impede the search for the
truth. The clear purport of the prosecutor's
endeavors in this instance was to implant in the
jurors' minds the baseless proposition that the
testimony of the two alibi witnesses was unworthy
of belief simply because they had cooperated with
defendant and his attorney and did not divulge
whatever information they possessed to law
enforcement authorities beforehand. Such false
suggestion of impropriety has no place in our
system of jurisprudence and should not be
tolerated.

Id.
Likewise, in State v. Eberhart, 727 P.2d 1374, 1378
(Okla. Ct. App. 1986), the court held that the failure of an
alibi witness to voluntarily notify the police was too "highly
ambiguous" to be used as impeachment evidence.
In this case, the prosecutor's line of questioning is
particularly misleading because in Utah the defense is required
to give notice of its intent to rely on an alibi.
Ann. § 77-14-2 (1995).
this case.

R. 32-33.

See Utah Code

The prosecutor received timely notice in
Indeed, the prosecutor sent an

investigator to interview Perry, who appeared to have been
cooperative.

R. 607.

This is not a case where the State was

faced with a surprise alibi defense.

Yet, despite receiving

adequate and timely notice, the prosecutor insinuated that there
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was something suspicious about the failure of the witnesses to
come forward earlier.
The prosecutor's comments were prejudicial.

As indicated

in Section III of this brief, the evidence in this case was not
strong, and conflicted with Appellant's alibi.

The prosecutor's

conduct was not aimed at a mere collateral issue, but went to the
very heart of Appellant's defense.

Recognizing that a

defendant's alibi evidence is critical to the outcome of a close
case, the courts in Hamlin and Costales reversed the convictions
based upon the prosecutor's misconduct.

Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d at

681; Costales, 87 A.D.2d at 635.

POINT II. DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE
PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused effective
assistance of counsel.
668, 688, 694 (1984).

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
In order to establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his
lawyer's performance was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) "there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different" had counsel not performed deficiently.
914 P.2d at 39.

A. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER USE OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE.
21

Hovater,

The prosecutor elicited from the victim, Kaufer, on
direct testimony that Kaufer had an "uncomfortable feeling" about
Appellant when he hired him to do repair work.

The prosecutor

then implied that the "uncomfortable feeling" Kaufer had about
Appellant was because he was a criminal.

Utah Rules of Evidence

4 04 and 608 prohibit the use of character evidence to prove the
defendant acted in conformity therewith.
P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986).

State v. Tarafa, 72 0

A prosecutor commits misconduct

when he argues to the jury that the defendant has criminal
inclinations, and is therefore likely guilty of the charged
crime.

Id.

Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's

misconduct or seek a mistrial.

Specifically, the prosecutor

elicited the following testimony:
Prosecutor: Any reason why you would have
stopped using him?
Witness:

Just kind of an uncomfortable feeling.

Prosecutor:

Why is that?

Witness: I have been in business 28 years and
you just get feelings about people.
Prosecutor: Did he say anything personally to
give you that feeling?
Witness:

No, just an uncomfortable feeling.

R. 549.
Defense counsel did not object.

Later, on redirect, the

prosecutor again deliberately elicited from Kaufer the same
testimony:
Prosecutor: You and Mr. Griffin spent
considerable time trying to ascertain how many
clients you've had in your business over the past
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few years, they were from 24 month to 5,000 plus.
Of all of those potential clients that you've
had, did you have any of the kind of feelings
that you had about Mr. Haga when he came to do
some work for you?
Witness: No. Mr. Haga was the only one that I
know of that I just felt uncomfortable with.
R. 593.

Again, defense counsel did not object.

The prosecutor

then proceeded to use this testimony to attack Appellant's
character during closing argument.
One thing I think is interesting, the defendant
has been into the store multi times known as Dee
Leasing. Mr. Kaufer got a funny feeling about
Mr. Haga. And I would suggest to you that it was
that funny feeling that Mr. Haga also picked up
because that's the reason, I believe, that
Mr. Haga defecated on the floor at Dee Leasing.
This wasn't just a burglary and theft. This was
also a statement of screw you, basically.
R. 378.
And the person who did it is Norman Andrew Haga,
and that's the reason Mr. Kaufer didn't have a
good feeling about Mr. Haga, because I think he
suspected back when the work was being done by
him that perhaps Mr. Haga was up to no good. And
you draw some conclusions from that, from
observations.
When people are in the store they may be looking
around. Who knows? Who knows what feelings or
vibes Mr. Kaufer had, but they weren't good.
Even though he was skilled in doing the computer
work and technology for Mr. Kaufer he only let
him do that one thing because of his feelings
that he had.
R. 378-79.

Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's

comments.
In this case, the prosecutor elicited evidence that was
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

The prosecutor asked the jury

to consider Kaufer's bad "feelings" as evidence of Appellant's
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guilt.

This line of argument drew the jury's attention to

matters they were not justified in considering.
"feelings" about Appellant were not relevant.

Kaufer's bad
The clear

implication from the prosecutor's questions and argument was that
Kaufer did not have a "good feeling" about Appellant because he
somehow could "sense" that he was a bad person, and that indeed,
his premonition about Appellant turned out to be true.

The

prosecutor even tried to legitimize and bolster Kaufer's alleged
"sixth sense" by commenting that out of all the customers Kaufer
has had, only Appellant gave him a bad feeling.

This is the

worst kind of character evidence because there is no way to rebut
it, yet at the same time it casts suspicion on the defendant.
Defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's conduct
amounted to deficient performance.

B. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO OBJECT WHEN THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY
BOLSTERED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE'S
IDENTIFICATION WITNESS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS.
A prosecutor may not assert personal knowledge of the
facts in an attempt to bolster a witness's credibility.
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

State v.

Prosecutors

engage in misconduct when they "assert personal knowledge of the
facts in issue or express personal opinion in the form of unsworn
testimony that tends to 'exploit the influence of the
prosecutor's office and undermine the objective detachment that
should separate a lawyer from the cause being argued.'"

State v.

Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Parsons,
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781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)).
In this case, during closing argument, the prosecutor
expressed his personal belief that the photo spread was very good
in an attempt to bolster Olson's identification by commenting:
What about identification? We have talked about
the photo lineup that was done. I have never
seen a photo lineup as good as that one in terms
of finding look-a-likes to Mr. Haga.
R. 372-73.
comment.

Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's

R. 373.

The prosecutor's comment invited the jury to

rely on his impression that the photo lineup was very good, thus
improperly bolstering the credibility of the State's eyewitness.
Since "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of
the Government," the jury was led to rely upon the prosecutor's
judgment rather than their own assessment of the reliability of
the identification.

State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah

1989) .
This case is strikingly similar to Hopkins.

In Hopkins,

the court held that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he
told the jury that he was "impressed by the evidence" in the
case.

Jd. at 479-80.

The court found that this statement

amounted to an expression of the prosecutor's personal view of
the weight of the evidence.

.Id. at 480.

In this case, the

prosecutor also expressed a personal opinion about the weight of
the evidence by indicating that in his experience, he had never
seen such a good photo spread.

This comment had the effect of

bolstering Olson's identification by making the photo spread seem
more reliable because of the prosecutor's personal assurance as
25

to its quality.

Like Hopkins, this comment was impermissible and

defense counsel should have objected and moved for a mistrial.

C. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S DISPARAGEMENT OF
THE DEFENSE.
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to object to the prosecutor's comment that the
defense was engaging in a "ploy" and was using unfair tactics.
It is improper for the State to make personal attacks on the
ethics or integrity of defense counsel.

United States v. Rios,

611 F.2d 1335, 1342 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Friedman,
909 F.2d 705, 709 (2nd Cir. 1990).

Remarks which imply that the

defense is engaging in unfair or unethical tactics are especially
egregious because they mischaracterize and distort the jury's
understanding of the roles of the attorneys and the adversarial
process.

Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709-10.
In this case, during trial, the defense attempted to

impeach the credibility of Kaufer by pointing out on crossexamination that he did not have receipts or invoices to account
for all of the merchandise he claimed was missing.

R. 571-593.

In response to this line of inquiry, the prosecutor stated during
closing argument:
A common ploy of defense attorneys is to try to
discredit the victim. We have eye witness
identification and vehicle identification. All
the things that the State has you're not left
with much then to try to discredit the victim.
R. 419.

The prosecutor went beyond the permissible bounds of
26

conduct by referring to defense counsel's legitimate efforts to
focus the jury's attention on the lack of evidence supporting
Kaufer's claimed loss of property as a "ploy."

Webster's New

World Dictionary defines ploy as "An action or a maneuver
intended to outwit or disconcert another person."

Disconcert

means to "upset or frustrate the composure or self-possession" of
another, "embarrass" or "confuse."

The word "ploy" implies then

a tactic which is both manipulative and underhanded.
The prosecutor's reference to the defense's efforts to
point out the lack of evidence supporting Kaufer's claimed
property losses was improper for several reasons.

His comment

mischaracterized the role of defense counsel by painting
counsel's efforts to represent his client as an attempt to use
unfair tactics to get an acquittal.

The prosecutor's comment

urged the jury to "ignore defense counsel's entirely legitimate
role as an advocate."

Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709. The

prosecutor's remark maligned defense counsel personally by
implying that he was willing to resort to unfair tactics to try
to trick the jury.

The prosecutor's comment also characterized

legitimate cross-examination as an attempt to harass and
embarrass the victim.

Lastly, the prosecutor's comment left the

jury with a distorted view of the adversary process by equating a
defense with a ploy.
In this respect, this case is similar to Friedman.

In

Friedman, the prosecutor also characterized the defense
attorney's role as an attempt to "get" the guilty "off," while
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the government sought justice.

Ld. at 708.

Because this comment

mischaracterized the defense's role and the adversarial process,
the court held that the prosecutor's conduct amounted to
reversible error.

Id. 709-710.

See also Rios, 611 F.2d at 1341-

42 (prosecutor's comments that the defense's investigator had
contrived the defense held reversible error).

Defense counsel

could not afford to allow the prosecutor's comments to go
unchallenged.

His failure to object and move for a mistrial

amounted to deficient performance.
Appellant was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to
object to the prosecutor's improper use of character evidence
against him, his comment on the weight of the photo
identification evidence, and his comments disparaging the
defense.

It cannot be emphasized enough that the outcome of this

case hinged on the jury's evaluation of the strength of the
eyewitness identification against Appellant's alibi evidence.
Any misconduct by the prosecutor which undermined the defense was
for this reason particularly damaging.

Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.

See Section III of this brief for a complete summary of the facts
of the case.

POINT III. APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE
PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED AND PERVASIVE MISCONDUCT.
The cumulative effect of the prosecutor's misconduct
requires reversal.

In determining whether errors are harmful,

the court will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's
misconduct where the evidence is less than compelling.
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If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence
susceptible of differing interpretations, there
is a greater likelihood that they will be
improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.
Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be
searching for guidance in weighing and
interpreting the evidence. They may be
especially susceptible to influence, and a small
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect
the verdict.
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.

See also Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1372-73;

Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786.

Even if there is sufficient evidence to

support a conviction, if the evidence is not compelling, the
prosecutor's misconduct is far more likely to have influenced the
jury.

Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786.4
The jurors in this case were asked to weigh the strength

of the eyewitness identification against Appellant's alibi
evidence.

There was no other evidence linking Appellant to the

burglary.

Though fingerprints were found on one of the burglary

tools, they did not match those of Appellant.

R. 451-52.

None

of the stolen property was recovered or linked to Appellant.
Olson's testimony regarding the description of the vehicle was
inconsistent.

Olson testified at trial that the lettering on the

side of the truck said "Custom Installations."

R. 466.

Olson

told Detective Hansen the day of the burglary that the truck had
blue, orange and black lettering on the side that had something
to do with insulation.

R. 343.

Detective Hansen admitted that

4

. The prejudice analysis outlined in this section applies
with equal force to Appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the prosecutor's use of character
evidence, his disparagement of the defense, and his comment on the
weight of the evidence argued in Section II of this brief.
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the description of the emblem on the side of the truck given to
him by Olson matched vehicles from a neighboring business called
Commercial Insulators.

R. 344.

The logo on Appellant's truck

was "Intermountain Installers" written in orange/red letters on a
blue triangle.

There was no black lettering on the vehicle.

R. 453, 525; State's exhibit 10-S.
license plate number.

Olson did not observe a

R. 467.

Olson's identification of Appellant was not solid.

Olson

seemed unsure as to how long he observed the man standing by the
truck.

R. 488.

He testified it could have been 10 seconds, but

also claimed he observed the man for as long as one to two
minutes.

R. 492-493.

Olson could only remember seeing the man

once as he pulled into his place of business.

R. 468-472.

could not remember seeing the man load any boxes.

He

R. 471, 474.

Olson could not describe the color or type of shirt the man wore,
the color of his pants, whether he was wearing a jacket or coat,
or the type of shoes he wore.

R. 498-99.

Olson never saw the

individual loading the truck enter the building.

He did not

identify the box being loaded into the truck as computer parts
from Dee Leasing.

R. 470-71.

Appellant presented compelling evidence that he was not
only somewhere else when the crime occurred, but that he was
physically incapable of committing the crime.

The physician who

had treated his foot the night before the burglary testified that
his foot was swollen and inflamed and that his injury prevented
him from engaging in any strenuous physical activity.
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R. 637-39.

Yet, the State maintained that despite this injury, Appellant
somehow was able to climb a wooden pallet over a six foot fence,
climb a tire rack onto the roof of the building to cut the phone
wires, and load $14,000 worth of computer equipment into a pickup truck.

Two witnesses testified that at the time of the

burglary, Appellant was at A & P Tire Company on 6217 West and
4100 South.

R. 596-97, 616.

Because of the conflicting evidence, this is precisely
the type of case where a prosecutor's misconduct is especially
damaging.

The prosecutor's repeated misconduct was particularly

prejudicial in this case because he unfairly undermined
Appellant's alibi defense, and at the same time improperly
bolstered the State's eyewitness evidence.

The prosecutor

engaged in a speculative and factually unsupported line of crossexamination with Appellant's key alibi witness, and then
improperly argued without a shred of evidence that he should not
be believed because he was Appellant's fence.

R. 424-25, 607-10.

He added to the prejudice by arguing the witness's prior
conviction substantively as character evidence to bolster his
otherwise unsupported claim that he purchased stolen property
from Appellant.

R. 424-25.

The prosecutor further unfairly

undermined Appellant's alibi by implying that the alibi witnesses
were not credible because they had not spoken with law
enforcement prior to the time required by statute.
07.

R. 448, 606-

He also suggested to the jury that they consider the

victim's bad "feeling" he had about Appellant as evidence of his
31

guilt.

R. 378-79, 549, 593.

The prosecutor then invited the

jury to rely upon his own expertise in evaluating the strength of
the photo identification.

R. 372-73.

Last, but not least, the

prosecutor undermined the entire defense by insinuating that
defense counsel was engaging in unfair tactics aimed at confusing
the jury and embarrassing the victim.

R. 419.

Appellant was further prejudiced by defense counsel's
failure to object to the majority of the prosecutor's misconduct
and demand a mistrial.

Defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to

run rampant and the trial court likewise did nothing to stop
him.5

POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT STATUTORY
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE RESTITUTION TO BE PAID TO THE
VICTIM'S INSURANCE COMPANY.
At sentencing, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay
Travelers Insurance Company $13,13 0 in restitution.

5

R. 315.

See

. The prosecutor's use of character evidence in the form of
Kaufer's testimony that he had a bad feeling about Appellant, his
personal attack on defense counsel, his substantive use of Perry's
prior conviction, and his statements regarding the photo spread all
constituted plain error. Palmer, 860 P. 2d at 343. The court will
find plain error if (1) an error exists; (2) it should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (3) it was harmful. Id. at 342.
In Palmer the court held that the prosecutor's use of unsupported
innuendo was plain error, despite the fact that the error was not
readily apparent to the court. Id. at 343. The court also found
that the prosecutor's examination of one witness as to the veracity
of another witness and his argument in closing on matters not in
evidence were plain error. Id. at 343-45. Likewise, in this case,
the blatant and egregious nature of the prosecutor's repeated
misconduct should be held plain error. Even if his comments were
not "obvious," because of their harmful effect, that requirement
should be dispensed "so that justice can be done." Id. at 344.
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Appellant's Presentence Report.

Current code provisions do not

permit restitution awards to insurance companies that merely pay
an insured's covered expenses.

Although an insurance company's

payments to an insured were previously within the permissible
scope of restitution awards, recent amendments to the code
exclude such expenses.

Prior to 1995, insurance companies that

had reimbursed the victims of criminal conduct were also held to
be "victims" for purposes of restitution.

State v. Staver, 706

P.2d 611, 613 (Utah 1985), citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (d)
(1983) (defining "victim" as a person who the court determines
has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of a defendant's
criminal actions), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1983)
(stating that a "person" may be a corporation).
In 1995 and 1996, however, the code was amended and
established new limits on the scope of restitution orders.

Under

the current code, an insurance company that reimburses the
pecuniary expenses of a victim of criminal conduct is no longer
itself a "victim" for purposes of restitution orders.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1996) provides:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to victims of crime as provided in
this subsection, or for conduct for which the
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part
of a plea agreement. For purposes of
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined
in Section 77-38-2, and family member has the
meaning as defined in Section 77-37-2.
(emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (9) (a) (Supp. 1996)
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provides:
"Victim of a crime" means any person against whom
the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have
been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or
minor personally or as a party to the offense or
conduct or, in the discretion of the court,
against whom a related crime or act is alleged to
have been perpetrated or attempted, unless the
natural person is the accused or appears to be
accountable or otherwise criminally responsible
for or criminally involved in the crime or
conduct or a crime or act arising from the same
conduct, criminal episode, or plan as the crime
is defined under the laws of this state.
(emphasis added).
It is a longstanding rule that a statute should be
construed according to its plain language.

A.B. v. State of

Utah, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

When

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court should not
look beyond it to surmise the legislature's intent.

Id.

"When

language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what
it expressed, and no room is left for construction."

Id.

(quoting Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic v. Frederick,
890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)).

"Unless statutory language is

"unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contradiction
to the express purpose of the statute,' this court applies the
statute's literal wording."

State v. Parker, 314 Utah Adv. Rep.

58, 58 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Allred v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., 914 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
The 1995 amendment reflects two substantive changes.
First and foremost, the change limited restitution to the actual
or direct victim of criminal conduct; that is, any "person
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against whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been
perpetrated."

Consequently, persons against whom the defendant

is not alleged to have committed the crime are not included as
"victims" under the amended code.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

201(4)(a)(i) clearly and in plain terms directs the court to the
definition of "victim" found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 when
determining who is entitled to restitution.

The definition of

"victim" found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (e) (i) does not
apply to restitution orders.

Therefore, the issue is whether the

insurance company is a "person against whom the charged crime or
conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated."6
In combination, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) and
77-38-2(9)(a) limit the court's ability to order restitution.
The current code provides for restitution to the direct or actual
victim of criminal conduct.

Thus, except in circumstances where

the insurance company is the direct victim of criminal conduct,
the insurance company may not obtain a restitution order.7

In

this case, the charged crime or conduct of burglary and theft was
not alleged to have been perpetrated against Traveler's

6

. Originally, the 1995 version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-38(9) (a) defined a "victim" as a "natural person."
In 1996, the
legislature amended this provision to apply to a "person," thus
including corporations where the corporation was the actual or
direct victim of the criminal conduct, as in an insurance fraud
case. Significantly, though given the opportunity, the legislature
did not broaden restitution to those who are not the direct victims
of the charged crime.
7

An insurance company, of course, could still seek
reimbursement by instigating a separate, civil action against the
person that caused the insured's damages.
35

Insurance Co.

The person against whom the charged crime was

perpetrated was Dee Leasing.

Accordingly, Traveler's Insurance

Co. is not a "victim" entitled to restitution under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i).

POINT V. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO MOVE FOR A CONTINUANCE IN RESPONSE TO
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE TIMELY DISCOVERY.
Defense counsel made a request for discovery of "all
documentation promised at the preliminary hearing relating to all
items allegedly stolen by the Defendant including but not limited
to:

bills of shipping, bills of receipt, serial numbers, order

and receipt of order information, cancelled checks, insurance
claims, paid in full receipts, received on account notices, etc."
R. 28-29.

At trial, defense counsel noted that Kaufer did not

provide receipts or invoices to document all of the merchandise
he alleged had been stolen.

R. 573.

Counsel argued mid-trial

that the State had failed to comply with a voluntary agreement to
provide discovery of the receipts.

R. 573-74.

Counsel indicated

that while he did receive some receipts, the State did not
provide them until the eve of trial.

R. 576.

Counsel argued

that he was prejudiced by the incomplete and delinquent response
to discovery because he was not able to adequately cross-examine
Kaufer about the existence of the claimed property.

R. 577.

Despite this complaint, counsel failed to request a continuance.
When the State chooses to respond voluntarily to a
discovery request under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal
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Procedure, "considerations of fairness require that the
prosecution respond to the request in a manner that will not be
misleading."

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987).

Should the government fail to do so, Rule 16 gives the trial
court the power to obviate any prejudice resulting from the
breach of discovery rules.

Id. at 918.

Failure of the

prosecutor to fully respond to a Rule 16 request can impair the
adversary process.
1989).

State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Utah

While a failure to make a motion for discovery does not

per se constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel does
have a duty to adequately prepare and investigate the case.
State v. Viail, 840 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Crestani, 771
P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

If counsel is not prepared

because of the State's violation of discovery rules, he has a
duty to seek an adequate remedy.
In this case, counsel failed to seek a remedy despite his
admitted lack of preparation.

The receipts were material to

Kaufer's credibility as to his testimony that merchandise had
been stolen from his place of business.

Since Olson was not able

to identify any of the boxes he saw being loaded into the pick up
truck, and no stolen property was ever recovered, Kaufer was the
only witness who could establish that a theft occurred.

For this

reason, Appellant was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to
seek an immediate remedy for the State's failure to comply with
its promise to provide the receipts.
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See Crestani, 771 P.2d at

1091-92 (trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain
pertinent bank records involved in the case).

POINT VI. COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE'S ONLY EYEWITNESS HAD
BEEN SHOWN A PHOTOGRAPH OF APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING.
Case law consistently recognizes that counsel has a duty
to prepare to defend a criminal defendant.
188; Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1090.

Templin, 805 P.2d at

When counsel knows of the

existence of information relevant to his client's defense, it is
his duty to investigate and subsequently present evidence
material to the case.

Jennings v. State, 744 P.2d 212, 214

(Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
In this case, defense counsel failed to present evidence
that prior to the preliminary hearing, but after Olson had seen
the photo spread, the State sent Olson a picture of Appellant.
R. 296-98.8

Several cases recognize the due process violations

that may be involved in eyewitness identification cases, and
discuss the need to apprise jurors of the factors to be
considered in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony.
See State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989); State v. Long, 721
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) .

Clearly, the fact that the eyewitness has

been shown a photograph of the defendant prior to trial is a
8

.
The State claimed it sent Olson a picture of Appellant
because someone had rigged a pipe bomb to Olson's door and
Appellant was a suspect. The photo was sent so Olson could "post"
it and "see what the individual looked like."
R. 297. Appellant
was never charged with this offense.
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significant factor calling into question the reliability of the
subsequent in court identification.
Given the importance of the identification in this case
and the conflicting evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury may have acquitted had they known of the tainted
identification.

In this case particularly, the only evidence

linking Appellant to the crime was this sole identification.
Counsel should have presented evidence that Olson's in court
identification was likely tainted by the photograph.

Olson's

in court identification was arguably a result of his having had a
photograph of Appellant to "post" in his place of business for
several months, rather than a result of anything he witnessed on
the day of the burglary.

Having called into question the

reliability of the in court identification, the jury would have
been left with the photo spread identification as the only
evidence against Appellant.

With the knowledge from the Long

instruction that photo identifications are less reliable, the
jury may well have concluded that the State had not met its
burden of proof.

R. 86.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests
this Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the
district court with orders for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing —
Definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as
defined in Section 77-37-2.

77-14-2. Alibi — Notice requirements — Witness lists.
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been made, who
intends to offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less than ten days before trial or
at such other time as the court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice shall
contain specific information as to the place where the defendant claims to have
been at the time of the alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to the
defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom
he proposes to establish alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than five
days after receipt of the list provided herein or at such other time as the court
may direct, shall file and serve the defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are known to him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer to
contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing
duty to disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which come
to the attention of either party after filing their alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply with the requirements of this section, the court may exclude evidence offered to estabUsh or
rebut alibi. However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf
concerning alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this
section.

77-38-2. Definitions.
For the purposes of this chapter and the Utah Constitution:
(1) "Abuse" means treating the crime victim in a manner so as to injure,
damage, or disparage.
(2) "Dignity* means treating the crime victim with worthiness, honor,
and esteem.
(3) Tailless" means treating the crime victim reasonably, evenhandedly, and impartially.
(4) "Harassment" means treating the crime victim in a persistently
annoying manner.
(5) "Important criminal justice hearings" or "important juvenile justice
hearings" means the following proceedings in felony criminal cases or
cases involving a minor's conduct which would be a felony if committed by
an adult:
(a) any preliminary hearing to determine probable cause;
(b) any court arraignment where practical;
(c) any court proceeding involving the disposition of charges
against a defendant or minor or the delay of a previously scheduled
trial date but not including any unanticipated proceeding to take an
admission or a plea of guilty as charged to all charges previously filed
or any plea taken at an initial appearance;
(d) any court proceeding to determine whether to release a defendant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur,
excluding any such release determination made at an initial appearance;
(e) any criminal or delinquency trial, excluding any actions at the
trial that a court might take in camera, in chambers, or at a sidebar
conference;
(f) any court proceeding to determine the disposition of a minor or
sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant or to modify any disposition of a minor or sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant; and
(g) any public hearing concerning whether to grant a defendant or
minor parole or other form of discretionary release from confinement.
(6) "Reliable information" means information worthy of confidence,
including any information whose use at sentencing is permitted by the
United States Constitution.
(7) "Representative of a victim" means a person who is designated by
the victim or designated by the court and who represents the victim in the
best interests of the victim.
(8) "Respect" means treating the crime victim with regard and value.
(9) (a) Victim of a crime" means any person against whom the charged
crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted by
the defendant or minor personally or as a party to the offense or
conduct or, in the discretion of the court, against whom a related crime
or act is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted, unless the
natural person is the accused or appears to be accountable or
otherwise criminally responsible for or criminally involved in the
crime or conduct or a crime or act arising from the same conduct,
criminal episode, or plan as the crime is defined under the laws of this
state.
(b) For purposes of the right to be present, "victim of a crime" does
not mean any person who is in custody as a pretrial detainee, as a
prisoner following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile who has
committed an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult,
or who is in custody for mental or psychological treatment.
(c) For purposes of the right to be present and heard at a public
hearing as provided in Subsection 77-38-2(5)(g) and the right to notice
as provided in Subsection 77-38-3(7)(a), "victim of a crime" includes
any victim originally named in the allegation of criminal conduct who
is not a victim of the offense to which the defendant entered a
negotiated plea of guilty.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 404, Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular' occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness,
does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only
to credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by
evidence otherwise adduced.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction
crime.

of

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that' a witness other than the accused has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 4U3, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been Convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However,
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an
appeal is admissible.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district sjhaW have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XTV
- ^

Section

protection.]
2. [Representatives - Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

., ..
to be paid.]
5- Power to enforce amendment]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurlfdiS^ereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State^hereon
thVy reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abndge the
S S T a r immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
E v e any person of life, liberty, or property without due F » ^ £ * » *
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2.

[Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State S S n g Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
K e c ? o k e of electors for President and Vice-President of the United Stetes
Spresentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State or
^members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male^oh**
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of^theparted
States or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or otber
c ^ Se^asis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or mihtary, under die
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
S e r of Congress, or as an officer of the United States « » « « £ £ £
flnv State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, w
S p o r t S e Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged m msurrecS n o V rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
S e l f . But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Pudblic debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
rlflim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
. and "ifli™* shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress *h*^ have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

Art. I

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived oflifey liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

